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Abstract
Using comprehensive administrative data on France’s single largest financial
aid program, this paper provides new evidence on the impact of large-scale
need-based grant programs on the college enrollment decisions, persistence
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ities in the grant eligibility formula to identify the impact of aid on student
outcomes at different levels of study. We find that the provision of 1,500 euros
cash allowances to prospective undergraduate or graduate students increases
their college enrollment rates by 5 to 7 percent. Moreover, we show that
need-based grants have positive effects on student persistence and degree
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1 Introduction
Access to higher education has increased substantially over the past two decades.
Between 1995 and 2010, the average OECD university entry rate rose from 37
to 62 percent. Despite this widening of participation in higher education, young
people with low-educated parents are still less than half as likely to be in higher
education compared with their peers in the general population (OECD, 2012).
These differences in educational attainment translate into persistent earnings
inequalities.
To lower the financial barriers to post-secondary education for low-income
students, many countries operate broad-based financial aid programs that pro-
vide tuition waivers and cash transfers. These programs are typically need-
based, with awards decreasing in parental income. Examples of such schemes
include the Maintenance Grant in the UK, the Spanish Becas, the Pell Grant
in the US and the French Bourses sur crite`res sociaux (hereafter BCS). These
programs cover a non-negligible fraction of the student population – up to a
third in the US and in France.
Despite the central importance of large need-based financial aid programs in
promoting equal access to higher education, and considering the financial stakes
involved, relatively little is known about their effectiveness in improving the
outcomes of low-income students. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a
comprehensive assessment of France’s single largest need-based grant program.
We take advantage of the existence of sharp discontinuities in the BCS grant
eligibility formula to estimate the impact of financial aid on college enrollment,
persistence and degree completion rates for low-income students.
The assessment of need-based grant programs requires going beyond eval-
uating their impact on college enrollment decisions, since the ability of such
programs to improve the educational and labor market outcomes of low-income
students ultimately depends on how they affect persistence and degree attain-
ment. Standard models of human capital investment predict that the provision
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of financial support should increase initial enrollment rates by lowering the
cost of college. The enrollment effects of need-based grants are therefore en-
tirely determined by the behavior of the “marginal” students, i.e., of those who
would not have attended college without financial support. In contrast, their
impact on persistence and degree completion rates depends on the behavioral
responses of both the “marginal” and the “inframarginal” students, the latter
group referring to students who would have attended college irrespective of
their eligibility for a grant. If marginal students are of substantially lower av-
erage ability than inframarginal students, then need-based grants might have
only a weak impact on persistence and degree completion rates. The provi-
sion of financial support could, however, improve the learning conditions of all
students by allowing them to work less, to be more focused on their studies
and to eventually complete a degree.1 Because the combined effect of these
“extensive” and “intensive” margin responses is uncertain, the overall impact
of financial assistance programs on student persistence and degree attainment
is fundamentally an empirical question.
The literature on student aid provides relatively little direct empirical evi-
dence on the impact of large need-based programs on college access and success
for low-income students. Most of the existing work focuses on more narrowly
defined programs, which have been implemented in the US for specific groups
of students and/or are operated at the level of a particular state or univer-
sity. Examples of such programs include the Veterans’ educational benefits
(Angrist, 1993; Stanley, 2003; Bound and Turner, 2002), the Social Security
Student Benefit Program (Dynarski, 2003) and a variety of state merit-based
programs targeted at students who meet certain academic requirements,2 or at
1Many students are constrained to work to fund their studies, which can have adverse
effects on their college attainment. In France, over 20 percent of students work on a regular
basis during the academic year (OVE, 2011) and recent empirical evidence suggests that
holding a regular part-time job has large detrimental effects on the probability of graduating
from college (Beffy et al., 2013).
2Studies include Dynarski (2008), Abraham and Clark (2006), Cornwell et al. (2006),
Kane (2007), Goodman (2008), Leeds and DesJardins (2012).
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students who are already in college (Angrist et al., 2009; Goldrick-Rab et al.,
2012), as well as state need-based grant programs which supplement federal aid
(Castleman and Long, 2012). To overcome the identification issues that arise
when estimating the impact of aid on student outcomes, the standard practice
has been to use policy changes and eligibility rules as sources of exogenous
variation to identify the parameters of interest. Most of the above studies find
that the provision of financial support has a positive impact on the targeted
groups’ college enrollment decisions and a few papers also find positive effects
on college attainment. It is, however, unclear whether these results would apply
to broader need-based grant programs, which typically serve larger populations
and are only awarded on the basis of students’ financial needs.
In contrast to this vast body of research, the available evidence on the effects
of large-scale need-based programs appears both limited and mixed. A number
of authors have investigated the effects of the aforementioned Pell Grants, with
a specific focus on initial enrollment decisions and choices amongst colleges.
Overall, existing studies find no clear and persuasive evidence that Pell Grants
significantly impact college access for the marginal, low-income student.3 To
our knowledge, Bettinger (2004) is the only paper to examine the effect of Pell
Grants on student persistence between the first and second year of college,
using discontinuities in the eligibility formula.4 His estimates suggest that
Pell Grants tend to reduce dropout rates but the findings are not completely
robust to specification. Empirical evidence on the impact of need-based grant
programs outside of the US is even more limited and mixed.5 In these latter
3For a review of empirical studies on the Pell Grant program, see Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2013). The complexity of the Pell Grant Program and its inflationary effect on
tuition fees are the two main factors that have been put forward to explain its limited
impact on college enrollment. This latter phenomenon is unlikely to occur in France, since
most higher education institutions are not free to set their own tuition fees.
4Castleman and Long (2012) also use discontinuities to evaluate the impact of grants on
degree completion rates, but they consider a program (the Florida Student Access Grant)
which supplements Pell Grants. They estimate the effects of this additional subsidy on
student outcomes but not the impact of the initial Pell Grant (i.e., of some aid versus no
aid).
5See Nielsen et al. (2010) for the Netherlands; Steiner et al. (2006; 2011) for Germany;
Dearden et al. (2011) for the UK.
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studies, the reliance on indirect sources rather than on direct administrative
data on grant applicants has typically prevented researchers from exploiting
small variations in grant eligibility formulas to identify the programs’ effects
on student outcomes.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on student finan-
cial aid. First, we are able to link administrative micro-data on the universe
of students applying for need-based grants in French higher education over
the period 2008-2010 with data on all students enrolled in French public uni-
versities. These administrative data allow us to exploit sharp discontinuities
in the assessment formula to estimate the impact of grant eligibility on stu-
dent outcomes without having to be concerned about student mobility across
institutions. Second, our analysis takes advantage of the fact that grant ap-
plications have to be renewed every year to estimate the effect of financial
aid on applicants’ decisions at each level of study, i.e., for those entering col-
lege as well as for those who are already enrolled in higher education. Third,
we investigate the impact of financial aid on a broader set of outcomes than
most previous studies have been able to examine, analyzing not only college
enrollment decisions, but also persistence and degree completion rates.
We find that the provision of 1,500 euros cash allowances to prospective
undergraduate or graduate students increases their college enrollment rates by
approximately 5 to 7 percent. Moreover, our estimates show that the effects
of need-based grants are not short-lived since eligibility for the cash allowance
has a positive and significant impact on the persistence rates of these students.
The effects on degree completion are more mixed. While being eligible for an
allowance of 1,500 euros is not found to significantly increase the probability
of graduating on time for college entrants, we find evidence of positive and
significant degree completion effects for continuing students, of about 5 percent
for applicants in the final year of a degree program, and of up to 13 percent
for prospective master’s students.
We interpret our findings as evidence that need-based grants can improve
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the educational outcomes of low-income students, both on the extensive margin
of college attendance and on the intensive margin of academic achievement in
university. Moreover, the estimated enrollment responses are relatively large
given the moderate size of the cash award. We view these findings as consistent
with recent studies showing that students can be influenced to make significant
decisions by small changes in college application costs.6 Our results suggest,
however, that the net social benefits from need-based grant programs are larger
for continuing students than for college entrants.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some institu-
tional background on French higher education and outlines the main features of
the BCS grant program. Section 3 explains the estimation strategy. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 examines the validity of the regression disconti-
nuity design, presents the main results and performs a number of robustness
checks. Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings and section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Higher Education and the Cost of College in France
The French system of higher education comprises various institutions, the vast
majority of which are publicly funded.7 After graduating from high school, stu-
dents willing to engage in post-secondary education can choose between two
main tracks. Out of the of 78 percent of high school graduates who decide
to enter higher education,8 the majority chooses to enroll in public universi-
ties (56 percent), which offer academic and vocational undergraduate degrees
(mainly three-year degrees called Licence), graduate degrees (Master) and doc-
6See Bettinger et al. (2012), Bulman (2012), Cohodes and Goodman (forthcoming), Hoxby
and Turner (2013) and Pallais (forthcoming).
7In 2010-2011, private institutions accounted for less than 18 percent of total enrollment
in higher education (MEN, 2013).
8The figures refer to the academic year 2010-2011.
5
toral degrees. French universities are not selective as the only requirement for
undergraduate admission is to have passed the high school graduation exam
(Baccalaure´at). About a third of the high school graduates who enter higher
education choose instead to enroll in special public high schools which offer two
types of courses: academically-oriented courses preparing for admission to elite
graduate schools (Classes Pre´paratoires aux Grandes E´coles) or professionally-
oriented courses leading to advanced vocational degrees (Sections de Technicien
Supe´rieur). Admission to either type of course is selective as there are only a
limited number of seats available for each program. Outside of these two main
tracks, a minority of high school graduates choose to enroll in specialized public
or private higher education institutions that lead to specific degree programs
(such as schools of art, architecture, journalism, etc.).
In France, the costs of post-secondary education are mainly driven by living
expenses, since tuition fees in public universities are set at a very low level (in
2010, annual tuition fees were 174 euros for undergraduate students and 237 eu-
ros for graduate students). Living costs incurred by students can, however, be
relatively high, as most higher education institutions are located in large cities.
Subsidized university residence halls are in very limited supply and housing
costs in the private sector can be substantial in some areas, even after taking
into account the housing benefits for which most students are eligible if they live
away from home. Recent surveys on students’ social and economic conditions
indicate that on average, college students living away from home spend around
700 euros per month to cover their living expenses. In addition, students have
to pay annual tuition fees and social security contributions (around 200 eu-
ros per year). According to our computations, the total average budget for a
nine-month academic year amounts to 6,300 euros, representing a potentially
important barrier to low-income students’ access to higher education.9
9The details of the calculations are provided in the paper’s online appendix (section A).
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2.2 The BCS Need-Based Grant Program
The Bourses sur Crite`res Sociaux program is France’s national financial sup-
port scheme for low-income students at the post-secondary level. About a third
of students enrolled in higher education receive a BCS grant, for a total cost
of 1.7 billion euros in 2010. Other forms of financial support, such as State
guaranteed student loans or merit-based grants, which exist on a large scale in
many countries, are almost non-existent in France.10
The amount of financial aid awarded through the BCS program depends
on applicants’ parental taxable income and a composite score which takes into
account their number of siblings and the distance between their parents’ home
and the university they plan to attend. The program consists of seven levels
of grants (referred to as e´chelons), which range from 0 to 6. Students who
qualify for a level 0 grant are exempt from paying tuition fees (if they attend
a public university) and social security contributions, but are not eligible for
cash benefits. In addition to the fee waivers, students who qualify for a level 1
grant receive an annual cash allowance of approximately 1,500 euros, which we
estimate to cover a third of the average living expenses of eligible students who
live away from home.11 This annual allowance increases by smaller increments
at each of the higher levels of grant (the average increment being 600 euros)
up to a maximum of 4,200 euros per year for a level 6 grant, which would
cover approximately 90 percent of the eligible student’s average living expenses.
The amounts awarded through the BCS program can therefore be regarded as
significantly reducing the cost of college education for low-income students.
Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the multiple discontinuities that
are generated by the grant eligibility formula to estimate the impact of qual-
10A program of State guaranteed loans was introduced in 2008 but with very limited
success, since less than 0.5 percent of students in higher education contracted such loans
over the first three years of the program. Publicly provided merit-based grants exist but
are awarded each year to less than 1,000 undergraduate and graduate students who already
qualify for need-based grants.
11See the online appendix (section A) for details on the calculation of the share of living
expenses covered by the different levels of BCS grant.
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ifying for different levels of grant on applicants’ outcomes. We detail below
the program’s eligibility rules and review the application process, emphasizing
the features which limit the applicants’ ability to manipulate the assignment
variables around the eligibility thresholds.
2.2.1 Eligibility Rules
To qualify for a BCS grant, students are required to apply for a full-time degree
program at a French higher education institution, to be under 29 years of age
at the time of application and to hold a high school diploma (Baccalaure´at) or
an equivalent degree.12 This latter requirement reflects the fact that in France,
as in most countries, access to post-secondary education is conditional upon
graduating from high school. The population of students eligible for a BCS
grant is therefore positively selected on educational attainment, as only about
half of the population of low-income adolescents graduates from high school.13
The level of grant to which applicants are entitled is a deterministic function
of their parental income and of a discrete-valued family needs assessment (FNA)
score called points de charge. Parental income is the taxable income that
appears on the tax notice that the applicant’s parents received in the year
preceding the application and corresponds to the amount of taxable income
that they earned two years before.14 During the period covered by our analysis
(2008 to 2010), the FNA score was computed on the basis of two criteria:
i) number of siblings, and ii) distance to university. Each sibling counts for
four points if he/she registered in higher education at the time of application
12Eligibility rules are detailed in the Circulaire 2009-1018 du 2-7-2009, Bulletin officiel
de l’Education Nationale no30 du 23 juillet 2009. Although some exceptions can be made
to the high school graduation requirement, high school dropouts only represent a negligible
fraction of BCS grant recipients, as it is the case for the Pell Grant in the US (the “Ability
to Benefit” option that allowed students without a traditional high school diploma to qualify
for a Pell Grant was removed in 2012).
13These estimates are based on the Panel d’e´le`ves du second degre´, recrutement 1995-2011,
DEPP – Ministe`re de l’E´ducation Nationale. See the online appendix (section B) for further
discussion.
14When parents are divorced or single, applicants are requested to report the taxable
income of the custodial parent’s household.
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and for two points otherwise. Extra points are awarded to applicants whose
parents’ home is located more than 30 km away from the chosen university,
one point up to 249 km and two points beyond. The points for siblings and
distance to university are added together to compute the FNA score, which is
capped at 17 points. The median score among applicants is 3 points.
The parental income thresholds that determine eligibility for the different
levels of grant depend on the applicant’s FNA score, generating multiple dis-
continuities. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the full set of
income eligibility thresholds that were used in the 2009 round of applications,
whereas Figure 2 shows the amount of cash allowance for which applicants with
an FNA score of 3 points would qualify depending on their parental income.
These applicants would not be eligible for a grant if their parental income
was above 46,145 euros, placing their family in the top quintile of the income
distribution of household income in France.15 To qualify for the highest level
of grant (level 6), their parental income would need to be below 10,509 eu-
ros, which corresponds approximately to the bottom quintile of the household
income distribution.
As most large-scale need-based grant programs around the world, the BCS
scheme awards grants on a yearly basis. Grants can be renewed up to seven
times but students are required to file a new application every year, their
parental income and FNA score being reassessed each time. In addition, grant
renewal is subject to minimum academic achievement requirements. Grant
recipients lose their right to a grant if they fail to obtain 60 credits (which
is the number of credits obtained in a typical university year) two years in a
row. In other words, grant renewal is suspended after two consecutive failures
in a given year level. Eligible students are also required to comply with the
attendance requirements set by their university and to take all of the exams.
Failure to meet these requirements may lead to the repayment of the allowance
15Source: authors’ calculations based on the Enqueˆte Revenus Fiscaux et Sociaux 2008.
All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros.
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received by the student.16
2.2.2 Application Process
The grant application process for students who are planning to enroll or to re-
enroll in a higher education institution begins in the January preceding the start
of the academic year and spans over several months. Individual applications
are processed by the regional branches of the national student service agency
(CNOUS). The main application steps can be summarized as follows.
(i) Official online application round (January 15 – April 30). Students
apply jointly for need-based grants and for student housing (optional) on a
dedicated website.17 They can submit up to four pre-registration applications,
as they may not yet have made a definitive choice regarding the institution or
degree program that they plan to attend at the start of the next academic year.
(ii) Processing of applications (May 1 – Mid-July). Individuals applications
are processed by the local branch of the student service agency upon reception
of all supporting documents. The grant schedule is updated in early July, after
which applicants receive a conditional grant notification indicating the level of
grant to which they are entitled for each of their pre-registration choices.
(iii) University registration and payment of allowance (Mid-July onwards).
The academic enrollment process begins in mid-July and lasts until the end of
September. Upon proof of registration, grant recipients start receiving the first
of their nine monthly payments in October and receive the final grant payment
in June of the following year.
Two key features of the BCS program limit the applicants’ ability to ma-
nipulate the information provided to the student service agency in order to
16Unfortunately, the extent to which these regulations are enforced in practice cannot be
measured from our data. This is because the exact reason for why certain applicants are
denied a conditional grant despite being eligible on the basis of their parental income and
FNA score is not specified. These grounds include not only the non-compliance with the
minimum academic achievement requirements but also the withdrawal of some applications
or the failure to send all the supporting documents to the student service agency.
17https://dse.orion.education.fr/depot/.
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qualify for higher levels of grants than they would normally be entitled to.
First, the exact values of the income thresholds that determine the amount
of financial support for a given FNA score are unknown to candidates when
they submit their application. To get a rough idea of the amount of grant for
which they would qualify, they can rely on an online simulator which is based
on the current year thresholds,18 and not on the actual schedule that will be
used to assess their eligibility. Income thresholds are updated in early July
and their new values cannot be precisely inferred from the previous ones, since
the adjustment usually goes beyond the inflation factor. The ability to predict
the new thresholds is further complicated by the fact that the online simulator
does not explicitly provide the current threshold values, but computes instead
the amount of grant based on the user’s stated parental income and FNA score.
In light of these practical aspects of the application process, it seems unlikely
that applicants would have sufficient knowledge to accurately predict how far
away they will be from the new thresholds.
The second key obstacle to manipulating the information that enters the
financial aid award formula is that applicants are required to submit all sup-
porting documents for their grant application. The only admissible proof of
parental income is a paper copy of the applicant’s parents’ tax notice, which
they received in the year immediately preceding the application. The tax notice
is also used to determine the number of dependent children in the applicant’s
family. The points awarded for siblings enrolled in post-secondary education
at the time of application are conditional on the submission of their university
enrollment certificates. Finally, the distance between the parents’ home ad-
dress (as shown on the tax notice) and the chosen university is computed by
the student service agency’s geolocation tool.
Not only is the scope for manipulation of the grant eligibility criteria limited,
but it is also very unlikely that the updated income thresholds would influence
18Users of this online simulator are informed that changes in the grant schedule can affect
the level of grant to which they will ultimately be entitled. They are further advised that
they should apply for a grant even if they are uncertain about their eligibility.
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the decision of whether or not to apply for a grant, since these thresholds are
unknown until applications have been fully processed. Moreover, it should be
noted that students have an incentive to submit an application even if their
parental income falls above most of the thresholds set by the BCS schedule,
because they would remain eligible for some form of financial support. Indeed,
all students who qualify for a grant of level 0 or above are at least eligible
for fee waivers. It is therefore in their interest to file an application even if
they do not qualify for the cash allowance. The only income thresholds that
are associated with a clear change in incentives to submit an application are
those that determine eligibility for a level 0 grant as opposed to no grant a
all. Around these thresholds, the number of applications can be expected to
decrease rapidly as a function of parental income. However, as long as students
cannot predict the exact location of the new thresholds, this decreasing pattern
should be continuous. This issue will be examined in more detail in section 5.1.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is based on linked individual-level administrative data that allow
us to track the enrollment decisions and academic progress of all prospective
college students who filed an application for a BCS grant.
We combine three main administrative data sources, which were provided to
us by the Statistical office of the French ministry of Higher Education (MESR-
DGESIP) and were matched using an encrypted student identifier: i) AGLAE,
which covers the universe of applicants to BCS grants over the period 2008
to 2010; ii) SISE, which includes all students enrolled in public universities in
academic years 2008-2009 through 2010-2011; and iii) OCEAN, which provides
the high school graduation exam (Baccalaure´at) scores of all high school seniors
between 2003 and 2010.
The AGLAE data contain basic information on the socio-demographic char-
acteristics of BCS grant applicants (gender, age, place of residence, etc.), the
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full set of variables that determine grant eligibility (including their parental
income and FNA score), the amounts of conditional and final grant awarded
as well as the degree program attended by the student (for grant recipients
only). The SISE dataset covers approximately two thirds of students enrolled
in higher education (i.e., all students attending academic or vocational courses
in publics universities), and contain basic information on the socio-demographic
characteristics of students, detailed information on the university, name and
year level of the degree program attended, and a binary variable indicating
whether students successfully completed their degree. For the academic year
2010-2011, we supplement the SISE data with an extract of the Base Centrale
de Scolarite´, which includes the universe of undergraduate students enrolled in
selective post-secondary vocational education or in preparatory classes to elite
graduate schools. Finally, we use the OCEAN data to retrieve individual-level
information about the high school graduation results of all grant applicants,
which are converted into percentile ranks for each cohort of high school seniors.
Because our enrollment data (SISE) does not cover selective higher educa-
tion institutions, we restrict our sample to the 62 percent of BCS grant ap-
plicants who listed only non-selective institutions among their pre-registration
choices, i.e., students who applied for undergraduate or graduate degree pro-
grams in public universities. The purpose of this restriction is to enable us to
track the college enrollment decisions of BCS grant applicants while minimizing
the risk of missing the enrollment of those who do not appear in the SISE data
– an issue which we address in section 5.3. High school applicants who failed to
pass the Baccalaure´at exam are excluded from the sample, since they are non-
eligible for the grant. To avoid including applicants who could have been aware
of the updated income thresholds when deciding on whether or not to apply,
we further restrict the sample to those who submitted their application before
July.19 Finally, we drop the relatively small fraction of applicants (13 percent)
19Although some late applications are accepted by the student service agency, they repre-
sent less than 14 percent of all applications. Late applicants’ decision to apply for a grant
could be influenced by the income thresholds that determine their eligibility for the different
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whose FNA score varies across their pre-registration choices through the points
awarded under the distance to university criterion, to avoid the complexities
induced by the fact that these applicants can be eligible for different levels of
grant across their different choices.20
We perform our analysis on a sample of high school graduates who applied
for a BCS grant before deciding on whether to enroll or re-enroll in university.
To get some sense of how this sample might differ from the more general popu-
lation of low-income high school graduates, we used data from a cohort study of
junior high school students who were followed throughout their educational ca-
reers from 1995 onwards.21 This cohort study does not provide information on
whether the students applied for a BCS grant, but it indicates that the fraction
of low-income high school graduates who eventually attended college is similar
to the fraction of first-year BCS grant applicants in our estimation sample who
enrol in university (75 percent) and that 80 percent of these low-income higher
education students received a BCS grant. Although this comparison should
be viewed cautiously, since it is based on data sources which are not directly
comparable, it suggests that a very large fraction of low-income high school
graduates apply for a BCS grant and hence that our population of study can
be considered as reasonably representative of the more general population of
low-income students who graduated from high school.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for our estimation sample of
BCS grant applicants, which we split into three groups: i) The “L0/No grant
cutoffs” sample (column 1) includes applicants whose parental income is close to
levels of grant, leading to differential application rates at the eligibility cutoffs. Consistent
with this assumption, we find evidence of significant discontinuities in the density of late
applicants’ parental income around the eligibility thresholds to level 0 and level 1 grants (see
online appendix, section F). Because the validity of the RD design is likely to be violated
in the presence of such behavioral responses, we decided to exclude late applicants from the
estimation sample. Including them in the sample does not, however, affect the results.
20In practice, including these applicants and using the eligibility thresholds that apply to
their first pre-registration choice yields similar results (see online appendix, section F).
21Panel d’e´le`ves du second degre´, recrutement 1995-2011, DEPP – Ministe`re de l’E´ducation
Nationale. See the online appendix (section B) for further discussion of the representativeness
of our estimation sample.
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the eligibility thresholds between no grant and a level 0 grant (fee waiver only);
ii) the “L1/L0 cutoffs” sample (column 2) includes applicants in the vicinity of
the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students become
eligible for an additional cash allowance of 1,500 euros per annum; iii) the
“L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs” sample (column 3) pools applicants who are close to
the income thresholds between two consecutive levels of grant in the level 1 to
level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros
on average. The table shows that with an average Baccalaure´at percentile rank
of about 60, BCS grant applicants tend to be of slightly higher academic ability
than the average high school senior in their cohort. The high proportion of
female applicants (around 60 percent) reflects the fact that in France, female
students are both more likely to enter higher education and to attend non-
selective colleges than males. Approximately 75 percent of applicants in our
samples are prospective first- to third-year undergraduate students while the
remaining 25 percent are prospective first- or second-year master’s students.
By construction, the average parental income of applicants in the L6/L5 to
L2/L1 sample (21,669 euros) is lower than that of applicants in the other two
samples (31,632 euros for the L0/L1 sample and 42,068 euros for the L0/no
grant sample). They also tend to have more siblings, which explains their
higher FNA score.
4 Empirical Strategy
We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of need-based
grants on applicants’ higher education outcomes. Our approach takes advan-
tage of the existence of sizable discontinuities in the amount of financial aid
that applicants can receive depending on their parental income and FNA score.
Our goal is to estimate the causal effect of being eligible for a need-based
grant on the outcomes of applicants. A simple OLS regression of the outcome
of interest (e.g., being enrolled in college) on an indicator for being eligible for a
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need-based grant would yield a biased estimate of the effect of grant eligibility
because eligibility is partly determined by parental income, and is therefore
endogenous. Even after controlling for family income, OLS estimates could
be biased due to the endogenous selection of applicants. Since not all eligible
individuals participate in the program, the decision to apply for a grant is likely
to be correlated with unobservable characteristics that affect the outcomes of
interest.
To identify the treatment effect of being entitled to a grant, we exploit
the fact that the BCS grant eligibility formula creates discontinuities in the
amount of financial aid awarded to applicants. Since the income thresholds
between different levels of grant are exogenously given, and assuming that the
information provided to the national student service agency cannot be precisely
manipulated by applicants, we can focus on applicants who are in the vicinity
of a threshold, and consider that those just below are very similar to those just
above. The amount of aid for which these applicants qualify can therefore be
considered as locally randomly assigned. Under the additional assumption that,
in the absence of treatment, the outcome of interest is a smooth function of
parental income, the causal effect of grant eligibility is identified by comparing
the average outcome of applicants immediately below the income thresholds
(treatment group) with that of applicants immediately above (control group).
Let Ti,k denote a dummy variable which takes the value one if applicant i
is eligible for a grant of level k (0 6 k 6 6). For expositional simplicity and
without loss of generality, we define eligibility for a level k grant as eligibility
for all level of grants up to k, i.e., Ti,k = 1⇒ Ti,k′ = 1 ∀ k′ < k.
Eligibility for a level k grant is a function of the applicant’s parental in-
come zi and FNA score si:
Ti,k = 1{zi 6 zk(si)} (1)
where 1{.} is the indicator function and zk(.) is a deterministic function that
returns the income eligibility threshold for a level k grant when the applicant’s
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score is si.
The amount of conditional aid Ai awarded to applicant i can be defined as
the sum of the allowance increments ak for which the applicant qualifies over
all possible levels of grant:
Ai =
6∑
k=0
akTi,k (2)
We model the relationship between grant eligibility and the outcomes of
interest using the following reduced-form equation:
yi = α +
6∑
k=0
βkTi,k + i (3)
In equation (3), the parameters βk are the treatment effects of switching
the applicant’s eligibility status from a level k − 1 grant to a level k grant:
βk = E(yi|Ti,k = 1)− E(yi|Ti,k−1 = 1) (4)
Under the assumption that the conditional mean function E(|z, s) is con-
tinuous in parental income z at the income eligibility threshold zk(s), the treat-
ment effect βk is identified by the difference:
lim
s↑zk(s)
E(y|z, s)− lim
s↓zk(s)
E(y|z, s) (5)
A specific feature of the BCS grant eligibility formula is that it generates
a large number of discontinuity points, which vary with the FNA score and
the level of grant considered. As can be seen in Figure 1, there are in total
126 different income eligibility thresholds (7 grant level thresholds for each of
the 18 possible values taken by the FNA score). Due to sample size limita-
tions, separate estimations at each income threshold would be very imprecise.
We choose instead to pool the eligibility thresholds to construct three distinct
treatment samples. Our estimates are therefore not limited to applicants in the
neighborhood of a single cutoff but are applicable to a more general population.
(i) The first sample (referred to as the “L0/No grant cutoffs”) pools the 18
income thresholds that determine eligibility for a level 0 grant as opposed to no
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grant at all. At these thresholds, we identify the treatment effect β0 of being
eligible for fee waivers on the outcomes of applicants.
(ii) The second sample (“L1/L0 cutoffs”) pools the 18 income thresholds
between level 1 and level 0 grants. At these thresholds, we identify the treat-
ment effect β1 of being eligible for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros, for
applicants who already qualify for the fee waiver.
(iii) Our third treatment sample (“L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs”) pools the 90
income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant ranging from level 1 to
level 6. At these thresholds, the treatment effect is a weighted average of the
treatment effects β2 to β6, i.e., the impact of being eligible for an incremental
annual allowance of approximately 600 euros, with weights equal to the fraction
of applicants around each threshold.
We apply the non-parametric approach based on local linear regression de-
scribed by Lee and Lemieux (2010). We use a triangular (edge) kernel and the
optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).22
5 Results
In this section, we assess the internal validity of the regression discontinuity
design in the context of our study before discussing the reduced-form effects of
BCS grant eligibility on college enrollment, persistence and degree completion.
5.1 Validity of the Research Design
A key condition for an RD design to produce unbiased estimates of the treat-
ment under consideration is that there is no systematic manipulation of the
22We also checked that a parametric approach based on a split polynomial approximation
yields similar results (Lee, 2008). While the parametric approach may be sensitive to outcome
values for observations far away from the cutoffs, the non parametric approach avoids this
problem. To save space and because both approaches yield very similar results, we report
only the non-parametric estimates based on local linear regression. The presentation of the
parametric method and the complete set of parametric estimates can be found in the online
appendix (section I).
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forcing variable around the cutoffs. We argued earlier that the grant appli-
cation process minimizes the scope for manipulation of parental income and
FNA score, since the updated income thresholds are unknown to applicants
when they file their application. In this section, we formally test for the ab-
sence of manipulation of the forcing variables by showing that the distribution
of parental income does not exhibit discontinuities at the eligibility thresholds
and that the observable characteristics of applicants are balanced at the cutoffs.
To check for the absence of manipulation of the forcing variables, we start by
examining whether the density of parental income is continuous at the eligibility
cutoffs using the test developed by McCrary (2008). The graphical evidence
displayed in Figure 3 suggests that although the number of applicants tends to
decrease with parental income around the L1/L0 and the L0/No grant cutoffs,
the density of parental income is continuous. The McCrary test statistics, which
are reported in the online appendix (section C), confirm that regardless of the
treatment sample considered, there is no evidence of significant discontinuities
in the density of parental income at the cutoffs.
An alternative approach for testing the internal validity of the RD design is
to check whether the observable characteristics of applicants are “locally” bal-
anced on either side of the cutoffs. If there was non-random sorting, we might
expect some of these characteristics to differ systematically between applicants
immediately above and immediately below a given income threshold. For this
purpose, we use the information available on the characteristics of applicants,
which includes their gender, age, Baccalaure´at percentile rank, parental in-
come, FNA score, number of pre-registration choices, whether they applied
for accommodation in a subsidized university residence hall and whether their
housing application was successful.23
The results of the balancing tests, which are performed separately for each
23Note that contrary to grant eligibility, the allocation of university accommodation is not
determined by reference to income thresholds. The results of the balancing tests confirm that
the probability of being offered student accommodation does not change discontinuously at
the income thresholds between the different levels of grant.
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treatment sample, are reported in Table 2. They indicate that the observable
characteristics of applicants are well balanced on both sides of the cutoffs, since
less than 10 percent of the coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level
(Panel A). Furthermore, a chi-squared test based on a system of seemingly
unrelated regression with as many equations as baseline covariates cannot re-
ject the null hypothesis that the discontinuity gaps are jointly equal to zero
(Panel B).24
The empirical evidence discussed so far supports the internal validity of
the regression discontinuity design to evaluate the impact of BCS grants on
applicants’ outcomes. The next sections present our main results.
5.2 Discontinuities in Awarded Grants
For our identification strategy to yield causal estimates of the impact of grant
eligibility on student outcomes, it is important to establish that the amount
of conditional grant awarded to applicants changes discontinuously at the el-
igibility thresholds. For this purpose, we compare the differential amount of
conditional grant awarded by the student service agency to applicants on either
side of the cutoffs with the predicted discontinuities that would result from a
strict application of the grant eligibility formula.
Figure 4 plots, for the different treatment samples, the fraction of applicants
who were awarded a conditional grant (left panels) and the average amount of
cash allowance awarded (right panels) against their relative income-distance to
the thresholds. The graphs in the left panels show that approximately 90 per-
cent of theoretically eligible applicants were awarded a conditional grant. The
remaining 10 percent are either applications that were withdrawn or applica-
tions that were disqualified by the student service agency due to non-compliance
with the minimum academic requirements or because of missing supporting
24We further tested for the potential manipulation of parental income and FNA score in
current applications by using the information that returning applicants (i.e., 2009 or 2010
applicants who filed an application in 2008 and 2009, respectively) provided in their previous
application (see online appendix, section C).
20
documents. The graphs in the right panels show that the average amount of
cash allowance awarded to applicants exhibits sharp discontinuities at the in-
come thresholds and that these discontinuities are of the expected magnitude,
i.e., approximately 1,500 euros at the L1/L0 cutoffs, 600 euros at the L6/L5
to L2/L1 cutoffs and amounts close to zero on both sides of the L0/No grant
cutoffs. Importantly, the graphical evidence is not indicative of any system-
atic breaching of the assessment formula for applicants marginally above the
thresholds. The corresponding RD estimates (reported in the online appendix,
section D) confirm that the discontinuities in the actual amount of conditional
grant awarded to applicants are very close to the predicted ones. We next
examine how these differences affect college enrollment, persistence and degree
completion rates.
5.3 Impact on College Enrollment
To what extent does the eligibility for a need-based grant affect applicants’
decision to enroll or to re-enroll in college? To answer this question, we first
consider the full sample of applicants, irrespective of their level of study. This
sample thus includes college entrants and continuing students.
Figure 5 plots, for each treatment sample, the college enrollment (or re-
enrollment) rates of applicants against their relative income-distance to the
eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order
split polynomial approximation. Although the enrollment rates of applicants
appear relatively similar across the different samples (between 75 and 80 per-
cent), the three treatments considered have strikingly different effects on ap-
plicants’ enrollment decisions. Enrollment rates are unaffected by fee waivers
(graph 5a) but exhibit a clear jump when students become eligible for an an-
nual cash allowance of 1,500 euros (graph 5b). The impact on enrollment rates
of subsequent 600 euros increments in the amount of financial aid (graph 5c)
is positive but of smaller magnitude.
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The RD estimates reported in Table 3 confirm the graphical evidence. They
show that applicants’ enrollment decisions are affected by the cash allowance
component of the BCS grant but not by the fee waiver component. The base-
line estimates (Table 3) indicate that eligibility for fee waivers has no significant
impact on college enrollment (column 2), which is not entirely surprising given
the small amounts involved. In contrast, being eligible for a cash allowance
of 1,500 euros increases applicants’ enrollment rate by 2.7 percentage points
(column 4), the estimate being significant at the 1 percent level. This corre-
sponds to an increase of 3.4 percent from a baseline enrollment level of around
79 percent. Subsequent 600 euros increments in the amount of cash allowance
for higher levels of grants are estimated to have a small positive impact on
enrollment rates of approximately 0.7 percentage point, but the effect is only
significant at the 10 percent level (column 6).
The fact that we find a highly significant 2.7 percentage point effect on
enrollment from the first level of grant (1,500 euros) but only a small and
marginally significant 0.7 percentage point effect from subsequent 600 euros
increments does not necessarily imply that the marginal impact of grants is
decreasing in the amount of cash allowance awarded. Since we have only bor-
derline power to detect an effect as large as 40 percent of the estimated effect
of the 1,500 euros allowance, we cannot reject the possibility that the impact
of grants on enrollment is in fact linear. Consistent with this interpretation,
we show in the paper’s online appendix (section E) that within the L6/L5 to
L2/L1 set of cutoffs (where increments vary between 226 and 757 euros), larger
shifts in the amount of cash allowance tend to cause stronger enrollment re-
sponses. Assuming a linear effect, our reduced form estimate would translate
into a 2 percentage points increase in enrollment rates per 1,000 euros increase
in the amount of cash allowance.25
In the online appendix (section F), we perform a number of tests to assess
25This effect is estimated by scaling the reduced form estimate (2.7 percentage points)
to the actual amount of grant awarded to applicants at the L1/L0 cutoffs (1,342 euros, see
Section D of the online appendix).
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the robustness of our baseline estimates. Specifically, we investigate the sensi-
tivity of the estimated enrollment effects of grants to the choice of bandwidth
and test for jumps at non-discontinuity points by running placebo regressions.
Moreover, we explore the sensitivity of our results to the sample selection crite-
ria by including late applicants and applicants whose FNA score varies across
their pre-registration choices through the points awarded under the distance to
university criterion. Finally, we investigate the possibility that our estimates
could not be fully capturing the impact of grant eligibility on enrollment deci-
sion because our enrollment data (SISE) does not cover selective institutions
(preparatory classes to elite graduate schools, advanced vocational courses,
business schools, etc.). Our results are robust to all of these sensitivity tests.
We are therefore confident that our baseline estimates capture the full impact
of grant eligibility on applicants’ enrollment in higher education.
5.4 Heterogeneity of Enrollment Effects
We investigate potential heterogeneity in the college enrollment effects of need-
based grants by running separate regressions for different subgroups of appli-
cants, based on the year in which they applied, their gender, their level of
studies and their academic ability.26
The results from this heterogeneity analysis are reported in Table 4. The
enrollment effects of the three treatments of interest appear relatively stable
across the different years of data (Panel A), which indicates that our results are
26We also partitioned the treatment samples into different groups based on applicants’
Family Needs Assessment (FNA) score as well as on the components of this score: number of
siblings – which induces variation of household income per capita – and distance to university
– which measures an explicit component of the cost of attending. Overall, the results (shown
in the online appendix, section G) do not point to strong heterogeneity in the enrollment
effects of grants by FNA score or by its components. Our inability to detect significant
differences across these partitions is partly driven by sample size limitations, but could also
reflect the fact that, by construction, applicants assigned to the different groups based on
their FNA score (or on the components of this score) have different levels of average parental
income. Hence applicants with higher FNA scores are compared to applicants with lower
scores but also lower parental income, which could mitigate potential differences in their
responses to grant eligibility.
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not driven by a single round of applications. While fee waivers and incremental
changes in the amount of allowance are not associated with noticeable discon-
tinuities in the enrollment rates by subgroup, some differences arise when we
consider the impact of qualifying for a conditional cash allowance of 1,500 eu-
ros. A comparison of the point estimates by gender (Panel B) would suggest
that being eligible for such an allowance has a larger enrollment effect for males
than for females. The difference, however, is not statistically significant. The
subgroup analysis provides clearer evidence that the effects of level 1 grants
are larger for applicants entering undergraduate or graduate degree programs
(which correspond to the first and fourth levels of study, respectively) than for
continuing students. The estimates reported in Panel C of Table 4 are about
twice as large for the first and fourth level of study (4.2 to 4.3 percentage
points) as they are for the other levels of study (1.7 to 2.1 percentage points),
the difference being significant at the 10 percent level. These results suggest
that the decision to enter university or to pursue graduate studies is more heav-
ily influenced by the provision of financial aid than the decision to proceed to
the second or third year of a given degree program.
To explore whether the enrollment responses to grant eligibility vary by
level of academic ability, we divided our samples into four groups based on
applicants’ percentile rank on the Baccalaure´at exam (Panel D of Table 4). Our
results indicate that being eligible for a 1,500 euros allowance has a positive
and significant impact on college enrollment throughout the ability distribution.
The point estimates suggest, however, that the effects tend to decrease with
ability. Although not statistically different, the estimates are twice as large
for students in the bottom quartile of the ability distribution (3.4 percentage
points) as they are for students in the top quartile (1.8 percentage point). The
fact that the cash allowance component of the BCS program seems to have the
largest impact on the weakest students raises the question of its effects beyond
enrollment. In the next sections, we address this issue by examining the impact
of eligibility for a 1,500 euros grant on persistence and degree completion rates.
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For the sake of brevity, the results for fee waivers and for incremental changes in
the amount of allowance are not reported, as we find no evidence of significant
discontinuities at these cutoffs.27
5.5 Impact on Student Persistence
To study the impact of financial aid on persistence, we focus on students who
applied for a grant to start an undergraduate or a graduate degree program
and follow their progress through college. Our data allow us to track 2008
applicants for up to three years, and 2009 applicants for up to two years.
Figure 6 shows that the college enrollment effect of being eligible for a
1,500 euros allowance is not short-lived, since differences in initial enrollment
rates at the L1/L0 cutoffs are carried over to the following year. We inves-
tigate more precisely the effect of financial aid on persistence in Table 5, by
looking separately at undergraduate and graduate applicants, and by focusing
on other dimensions of persistence, such as promotion to the next level and
degree completion rates.
The first two columns of the table report the estimated impact of financial
aid on persistence for first-year undergraduates. For the sample of 2008 and
2009 applicants, eligibility for a 1,500 euros allowance is found to increase initial
enrollment rates by 4.9 percentage points (panel A), the effect being significant
and of only slightly smaller magnitude (3.9 percentage points) in the following
year (first line of panel B). These effects, which are our preferred estimates
of the impact of the cash allowance at college entry, correspond respectively
to an increase in the enrollment rate of 6.7 percent from the baseline and an
increase in the persistence rate of 6.6 percent. To gain a more complete picture
of the progress of first-year applicants through college, we analyze whether they
proceed to the next level as opposed to repeating the first year or dropping out
of college. Our results suggest that financial aid has a positive and significant
27Results are available upon request.
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3.7 percentage point impact on the probability of being enrolled as a second-
year student after one year (second line of panel B), which corresponds to a
9.8 percent increase from the baseline, but the estimated impact of financial
aid on the probability of having obtained all first-year and second-year credits
after two years of undergraduate studies is not statistically significant (third
line of panel B). The enrollment effect of being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash
allowance is still detectable for undergraduate students two years after their
application, with a marginally significant 4.4 percentage points (or 8.7 percent)
enrollment gap in 2010 for prospective undergraduate students who applied
for a grant in 2008 (first line of Panel C). The effects on the probability of
being enrolled in the third year level after two years and on the probability
of graduating on time are positive (respectively 1.9 and 2.1 percentage points)
but not statistically significant (second and third lines of Panel C). Overall, our
estimates demonstrate a clear impact of financial aid on student persistence
for undergraduate applicants but show not significant effects on on-time degree
completion. These results should nevertheless be interpreted with caution,
since the lack of statistical significance for the effects after two years could be
due to the fact that they are estimated on a relatively small sample. Moreover,
our data do not allow us to examine degree completion effects beyond a three-
year window.
Table 5 indicates that the effects of financial aid on persistence are strong
for graduate applicants (column 4). Students who applied for a grant in 2008
or 2009 to start a graduate degree program are not only more likely to en-
roll in college if they are eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance (first line
of Panel A). They are also more likely to successfully complete all first-year
credits (second line of panel A), to proceed to the next year level (first and
second lines of panel B) and to graduate on time (fourth line on panel B).
The estimated effects on enrollment, promotion and graduation are of similar
magnitude, between 4 and 5 percentage points. These results correspond to
5 percent increase in the enrollment rate of prospective graduate students, and
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to a 13 percent increase in their graduation rate. They show that the cash al-
lowance component of BCS grants is particularly effective at the graduate level,
as it increases not only enrollment and persistence, but also degree completion.
The overall graduation effect is likely to be a mix of the grant’s effects on the
“marginal” and “inframarginal” students, whose respective contributions can-
not be distinguished within our empirical framework. Some of the students
who would not have enrolled if they had not been awarded a conditional cash
allowance will have completed their degree after joining a master’s program.
In addition, the grant could allow students who would have attended college
irrespective of financial aid to study in better conditions, thus increasing their
chances of success.
In the online appendix (section H), we show that the estimated effects of
being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance in year t on student outcomes
in t+1 and t+2 should be attributed to the initial differences in applicants’
eligibility status rather than to the cumulative effect of persistent differences
in the amounts of grant that they received in subsequent years. Indeed, our
estimates indicate that year-to-year changes in parental income and eligibility
thresholds are large enough to almost completely remove discontinuities in the
amount of allowance received in years t+1 and t+2 by applicants who were
eligible for different levels of grant in year t.
5.6 Impact on Degree Completion
Figure 7 and Table 6 extend the analysis by examining the impact of financial
aid on students who applied for a grant before entering the final year of a degree
program, either the third year of a bachelor’s degree or the second year of a
master’s degree. The pooled estimates (column 6) indicate that being eligible
for a cash allowance of 1,500 euros not only has a positive and significant
1.9 percentage point impact on the enrollment rates of final-year applicants
but also increases their chances of completing their degree by a similar order of
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magnitude (3.1 percentage points, which corresponds to a 5.3 percent increase
from the baseline). The effect are more precisely estimated for the large sample
of undergraduate applicants (column 2) than for the smaller sample of graduate
applicants (column 4). The fact that low-income students who progressed to the
final year of a degree program are positively selected on achievement appears
as a plausible explanation for why the estimated degree completion effects of
financial aid tend to be larger for third-year undergraduate or second-year
graduate students than for college entrants.
6 Discussion
Our results show a significant impact of being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash
allowance on enrollment decisions, not only at college entry, but also at higher
levels of study. We further find evidence of a positive effect of financial aid
on persistence in college. Prospective first-year undergraduate applicants who
qualify for the cash allowance are not only more likely to start college, but also
to re-enroll in the following year and to progress to the next year level. After two
years, the effects on enrollment and degree completion remain positive but are
smaller and no longer statistically significant. At the master’s level, the effects
of financial aid are found to be more persistent, as graduate applicants who
are eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance are more likely to pursue graduate
studies and to complete their master’s degree after two years. These findings
are consistent with the selection process which occurs in French universities,
where admission is not competitive but where the weakest students tend to
drop out early. Our estimates suggest that the academic prospects of first-
year undergraduates who start college as a result of being awarded a grant
are similar to those of other college entrants, many of whom drop out along
the way. But as students progress through college, only the more able remain,
and grants appear particularly effective in subsidizing low-income students who
have reached these higher levels of study. Consistent with this interpretation,
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we also find positive effects on degree completion for prospective final-year
undergraduate and graduate students.
6.1 External Validity
Our estimates are based on a sample of low-income high school graduates who
applied for a BCS grant to start or to continue college studies. As far as we can
determine from cohort study data (see online appendix, section B), our sample
of first-year grant applicants is reasonably representative of the more general
population of low-income high school graduates in France. This latter group,
which represents approximately half of the entire population of low-income
adolescents, can be considered as comparable to the target population of most
large-scale need-based grant programs around the world, i.e., students who
meet the requirements for college admissions by holding a high school diploma
or an equivalent degree.28 Our results, however, cannot be readily generalized
to the population of low-income high school dropouts and of nontraditional
students,29 who might respond differently to financial aid.
Although the population of need-based grant applicants in France is likely to
resemble that of many countries, our results’ external validity depends crucially
on the institutional features of higher education systems. In France, as in
several continental European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Italy and
Spain, higher education institutions are mostly public and charge relatively
low fees (OECD, 2012). In these countries, need-based grant programs cover
part of low-income students’ living expenses and the general level of student
debt is very low. The French system cannot, however, be directly compared
to the US, where tuition fees are much higher and where students are more
28High school graduation rates in France are in the same ballpark as in most European
countries, but are lower than in the US (OECD, 2012).
29The main difference in eligibility criteria between the French BCS grant and the US Pell
Grant is that the later imposes no upper age limit, whereas BCS grants are restricted to
students under 29 years of age at the time of application. In the US, non-traditional adult
students aged 30 or more represent approximately 25 percent of the population of Pell Grant
recipients (U.S. Department of Education, 2012, Table 11-A).
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likely to take loans and to work to pay for college. For US students who are
not eligible for fee waivers, the enrollment effects of BCS-type grants (such
as the Pell Grant) are likely to be smaller than our estimates would suggest,
especially for students who are credit constrained or debt averse. By contrast,
our results are more readily applicable to the many US students who are entitled
to both need-based grants and fee waivers.30 Consistent with this prediction,
our estimates for first-year BCS grant applicants are similar to those found
in the US for students who can combine grants with fee waivers, whereas the
available evidence on the specific impact of Pell grants is much weaker (Kane,
2006).
6.2 Implications for Students’ Decision Making Process
Considering the magnitude of the college premium in France, the fact that
a significant proportion of grant applicants decide not to enroll in college as
a result of not being eligible for a 1,500 euros grant might seem surprising.
Using survey data, we estimate the lifetime-earning premium of two years of
undergraduate studies to be around 50,000 euros and the premium of holding a
master’s degree as opposed to a bachelor’s degree to be around 200,000 euros.31
Given these substantial returns, several barriers might explain why non-eligible
students do not borrow the amount of the grant to finance their studies.
Net present value calculations indicate that grant applicants would need to
be severely financially constrained to forego college education as a result of not
being eligible for a 1,500 euros grant. While the extent to which borrowing
constraints affect college decisions is widely debated in the US,32 the fact that
less than 0.5 percent of students participate in the State-guaranteed loan pro-
30California has several state-funded programs that waive the enrollment fees for eligible
students at community colleges (Board of Governors Fee Waiver) and at four-year colleges
(Cal Grants). Other States, such as Georgia (HOPE Scholarship) or Massachusetts (John
and Abigail Adams Scholarship), also offer merit-based aid to cover fees. These state-funded
fee waivers can be combined with Pell Grants for eligible students.
31Details of the analysis of students’ decision making process are provided in the online
appendix (section K).
32See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) for a review.
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gram that was introduced in France in 2008 suggests that liquidity constraints
are not the most plausible explanation for our findings.
Individual heterogeneity in the expected returns to higher education is an al-
ternative explanation for why a substantial fraction of applicants decide to give
up college because they are not eligible for the grant. Our calculations suggest
that to rationalize such choices under standard borrowing and discount rates,
the marginal applicant would need to considerably underestimate the returns
to college education, by a factor of three at the undergraduate level and by a
factor of eight at the graduate level. These estimates, however, are based on av-
erage returns which might not accurately reflect the potentially lower returns
for the marginal applicant. Moreover, low-income students might underesti-
mate their chances of graduating or be more averse to uncertainty in returns,
both of which would reduce their expected benefits from college education.33
While low expected returns could play a key role in explaining undergradu-
ate students’ response to the grant, they seem somewhat less plausible at the
graduate level.
Psychological factors are another important dimension to take into con-
sideration when analyzing students’ decision to enroll in college. High time
preferences, which have been cited as a credible explanation for high school
students’ dropout behavior (Oreopoulos, 2007), could also explain why some
grant applicants decide against going to college. Our calculations indicate
that for discount rates above 10 percent at the undergraduate level, and above
20 percent at the graduate level, the present discounted costs of college ed-
ucation would outweigh the discounted benefits for grant applicants who are
denied financial aid. Available field and laboratory evidence suggests that such
high time preferences are not uncommon among the population of adolescents
(Frederick et al., 2002; Golsteyn et al., forthcoming). Moreover, psychological
33Empirical evidence on the accuracy of students’ expectations of the economic returns
to college education is scarce and mixed. Rouse (2004) finds no evidence of a systematic
underestimation of college returns by economically disadvantaged students, but Betts (1996)
does. More recently, Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) find evidence that providing information
on post-secondary education to low-income students tends to increase their expected returns.
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factors such as psychic disutility of debt beyond borrowing cost, could explain
why non-eligible grant applicants forgo college education instead of taking a
loan to cover their study costs (Field, 2009). Consistent with out results, sev-
eral studies find large behavioral responses to small-scale interventions (Bet-
tinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner, 2013) or to modest institutional changes
(Bulman, 2012; Pallais, forthcoming) that reduce college application costs. In
particular, Cohodes and Goodman (forthcoming) show that relatively small
merit grants induce students to enroll in lower-quality state colleges – a finding
that is hard to explain in a classical human capital model.
Although our data do not allow us to precisely identify the mechanisms at
play, the college enrollment decisions of need-based grant applicants in France
seem more likely to be driven by a combination of low expected returns, high
time preferences and psychic costs than by credit constraints. A further explo-
ration of the behavioral and psychological factors that may influence educa-
tional choices would be particularly useful for gaining a better understanding
of low-income students’ response to grants.
6.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations can be performed to get some sense
of the French BCS program’s cost-effectiveness.34 The estimates reported in
Panel A of Table 5 show that the provision of 1,500 euros cash allowances
increases college enrollment rates by 4.9 percentage points for undergraduate
applicants and by 3.7 percentage points for graduate applicants, from a baseline
rate of approximately 73 percent in both cases. The costs of inducing more
students to enroll in higher education through the provision of such grants
includes the distribution of cash allowances to all eligible students, the financ-
ing of two years of college education for students who are induced to enroll
as a result of the grant, and the earnings foregone by these students while
34See the online appendix (section J) for the details of the cost-benefit calculations.
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in college. According to our computations, these costs would amount to ap-
proximately 100,000 euros per undergraduate student induced to attend some
college (without graduating), and 125,000 euros per graduate student induced
to complete a master’s degree. These costs are to be compared with the bene-
fits from college studies, which include not only private returns, but also social
returns, which we measure conservatively through the higher taxes and social
security contributions paid. Given the substantial returns to college education
in France, we estimate the net present discounted value of distributing cash al-
lowances of 1,500 euros per student induced to attend college to be positive at
all levels, but much larger for graduate applicants (300,000 euros) than for un-
dergraduate applicants (40,000 euros). It would take approximately 15 years
to balance the costs and benefits of such grants for graduate applicants, as
opposed to 30 years for undergraduates.
7 Conclusion
Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide causal evidence on the ef-
fects of a large French need-based grant program on college enrollment, per-
sistence and degree completion for low-income students. We find that the
provision of 1,500 euros cash allowances to prospective undergraduate or grad-
uate students increases their college enrollment rates by approximately 5 to
7 percent. Moreover, we show that need-based grants have positive effects on
student persistence and degree completion.
While our calculations suggest that the BCS grant program is cost-effective
for both college entrants and continuing students, they point to larger net
social benefits at the graduate level. Improving the effectiveness of need-based
grant programs therefore requires identifying adequate policy responses to the
non-financial barriers – such as poor academic preparation and insufficient
monitoring – that could affect the ability of low-income college entrants to
persist to degree completion.
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Figure 1 – Income Eligibility Thresholds for the Different Levels of BCS Grant
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Notes: The figure shows the income eligibility thresholds for the different levels of grants (denoted L0 to L6)
awarded through the French Bourses sur crite`res sociaux program in 2009. The thresholds, which depend
on the applicant’s family need assessment (FNA) score, apply to parental taxable income earned two years
before the application (x-axis). The FNA score (y-axis) is capped at 17 and has a median value of 3. Income
thresholds are expressed in 2011 euros.
Figure 2 – Amount of Annual Cash Allowance Awarded to Applicants with an
FNA Score of 3 Points, as Function of their Parents’ Taxable Income
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Notes: The figure shows the amount of annual cash allowance awarded in 2009 to BCS grant applicants with a
family needs assessment (FNA) score of 3 points (median value), as a function of their parents’ taxable income
two years before the application. Applicants eligible for a level 0 grant qualify for fee waivers only. Applicants
eligible for higher levels of grant qualify for fee waivers and an annual cash allowance, the amount of which varies
with the level of grant: 1,476 euros (level 1), 2,223 euros (level 2), 2,849 euros (level 3), 3,473 euros (level 4),
3,988 euros (level 5) and 4,228 euros (level 6). Income thresholds and allowance amounts are expressed in 2011
euros.
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Figure 3 – McCrary (2008) Test for Manipulation of the Assignment Variable
at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No Grant Cutoffs)
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(b) e1,500 Allowance (L1/L0 Cutoffs)
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(c) e600 Increment (L6/L5 to L2/L1 Cutoffs)
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Notes: The figure plots weighted kernel density estimates, performed separately on either side of income eligi-
bility thresholds. The “fee waiver” sample includes applicants whose parental income is close to the eligibility
thresholds between no grant and a level 0 grant (fee waiver only). The “1,500 euros allowance” sample includes
applicants in the vicinity of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students (who
already qualify for the fee waiver) become eligible for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros. The “600 euros
increment” sample includes applicants close to the income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant in the
level 1 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros on average. The
x-axis is the relative distance between the applicant’s parental income and the income eligibility threshold. The
optimal bandwidth and bin size are obtained using the selection procedure proposed by McCrary (2008).
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Figure 4 – Fraction of Applicants Awarded a Conditional Grant and Average
Amount of Allowance Awarded at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No Grant Cutoffs)
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Notes: The circles represent the average fraction of applicants who were awarded a conditional grant (left
panels) and the average amount of allowance awarded (right panels) per interval of relative income-distance
to the eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order polynomial approximation
which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoffs. The vertical lines identify the eligibility cutoffs.
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Figure 5 – College Enrollment Rate of Grant Applicants at Different Income
Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No grant Cutoffs)
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(c) e600 Increment (L6/L5 to L2/L1 Cutoffs)
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment rate of grant applicants per interval of relative income-
distance to the eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order polynomial ap-
proximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoffs. The vertical lines identify the eligibility
cutoffs.
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Figure 6 – College Enrollment and Persistence Rates of First-Year Undergrad-
uate and Graduate Applicants at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff
(a) Enrolled in College in Current Year
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(b) Enrolled in College in Following Year
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment rate of first-year undergraduate or graduate applicants
in the year of application (left panel) and in the following year (right panel), per interval of relative income-
distance to the eligibility thresholds. The sample includes 2008 and 2009 applicants entering the first year of a
three-year bachelor’s degree or the first year of a two-year master’s degree. The solid lines are the fitted values
from a second-order polynomial approximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoff. The
vertical lines identify the eligibility cutoffs.
Figure 7 – College Enrollment and Degree Completion Rates of Final-Year
Undergraduate and Graduate Applicants at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility
Cutoff
(a) Enrolled in College in Current Year
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(b) Completed Degree in Current Year
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment (left panel) and the degree completion rate (right panel)
of final-year undergraduate or graduate applicants, per interval of relative income-distance to the eligibility
thresholds. The sample includes 2008 to 2010 applicants entering the final year of a three-year bachelor’s
degree or the final year of a two-year master’s degree. The solid lines are the fitted values from a second-order
polynomial approximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoff. The vertical lines identify
the eligibility cutoffs.
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics on Applicants to BCS Need-Based Grants at
Different Income Eligibility Thresholds (2008-2010)
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
(1) (2) (3)
Applicants:
Female .59 .60 .61
Age 20.5 20.6 20.9
(2.3) (2.1) (2.2)
Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank 61.2 59.3 56.5
(23.6) (23.6) (23.8)
Number of pre-Registration Choices 1.8 1.7 1.7
(1.1) (1.0) (1.0)
Applications:
Parents’ Taxable Income (Euros) 42,068 31,632 21,669
(9,066) (6,815) (6,469)
Family Needs Assessment Score 2.9 3.4 3.8
(2.3) (2.5) (2.8)
Number of Siblings .9 1.0 1.2
(.8) (.9) (1.1)
Distance to College (Km) 137 132 132
(229) (218) (230)
Applied for University Housing .37 .31 .32
Successful Housing Application .12 .13 .16
Level of Study:
First Year .28 .25 .25
Second Year .26 .28 .27
Third Year .22 .24 .24
Fourth Year .14 .14 .14
Fifth Year .11 .10 .10
Conditional Grant:
Awarded a Conditional Grant .70 .92 .92
Amount of Cash Allowance Awarded (Euros) 2 819 2,642
(64) (746) (1,114)
Final grant:
Receives Grant .51 .70 .70
Amount of Cash Allowance Received (Euros) 13 658 2,014
(202) (759) (1480)
College Enrollment:
Enrolled in College .79 .80 .78
N 96,390 194,513 284,601
Notes: The samples are constructed from the AGLAE administrative dataset, which covers the universe of applicants to need-based grants awarded
through the French Bourses sur crite`res sociaux program for the period 2008 to 2010. Only applicants who listed university degree programs on each of
their pre-registration choices, who submitted their application before July and whose FNA score does not vary across pre-registration choices are included.
The “fee waiver” treatment sample (column 1) includes applicants whose parental income is within ±20 percent of the eligibility thresholds between no
grant and a level 0 grant (which consists of a fee waiver). The “1,500 euros allowance” sample (column 2) includes applicants whose parental income is
within ±16 percent of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students (who already qualify for the fee waiver) become eligible for
an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros. The “600 euros increment” sample (column 3) includes applicants whose parental income is within ±6 percent of
the income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant in the level 1 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros
on average. The applicants’ percentile rank on the Baccalaure´at high school graduation exam was retrieved from the OCEAN dataset covering the period
2003 to 2010. Information on college enrollment comes from the SISE dataset which includes all students registered in a French public university in
academic years 2008-2009 through 2010-2011. All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2 – Balance of Applicants’ Baseline Characteristics in the Year of Appli-
cation, at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds (2008-2010 Applicants)
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Mean Estimates Mean Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Each Baseline Characteristic Separately
Male .401 .005 .406 -.002 .392 .005
(.011) (.006) (.005)
41,618 141,024 172,909
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Age 20.49 .03 20.62 .04 20.84 .02
(.04) (.03) (.02)
70,883 108,817 197,075
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank 61.18 -.04 60.02 .01 56.70 .14
(.47) (.24) (.30)
61,174 178,151 121,812
[89,139] [178,151] [254,720]
Number of pre-Registration Choices 1.89 -.07*** 1.71 .01 1.72 -.00
(.02) (.01) (.01)
80,517 98,595 178,202
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Parents’ Taxable Income (Euros) 48,115 66 34,208 48 22,238 86*
(217) (93) (52)
33,379 93,392 284,601
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Family Needs Assessment Score 2.58 .02 3.21 .02 3.75 .03
(.06) (.04) (.03)
31,921 90,340 221,654
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Applied for University Housing .429 -.016 .319 -.000 .315 -.001
(.010) (.006) (.004)
63,682 112,060 272,276
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Successful Housing Application .114 .009 .123 .003 .158 -.001
(.006) (.004) (.003)
61,252 124,692 260,070
[96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
B. All Baseline Characteristics Jointly
χ2-stat 10.95 3.21 6.77
P-value .204 .920 .561
Notes: The table shows non-parametric regression discontinuity estimates to assess the difference in the value of applicants’ baseline characteristics at the income eligibility
thresholds between different levels of grant. Panel A evaluates separately whether each baseline characteristic is balanced. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression,
where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the
L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the
income eligibility thresholds. The non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths
are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The number of observations used in the non-parametric estimations
are reported below the standard errors. Full sample sizes are in square brackets. Panel B tests whether the baseline characteristics are jointly balanced by i) estimating a
system of seemingly unrelated regressions where each equation represents a different baseline covariate and includes a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed
to differ on either side of the cutoffs and ii) performing a χ2 test for the discontinuity gaps in all equations being zero. All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros. *: p<0.10;
**: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 3 – Discontinuities in College Enrollment Rates at Different Income Eli-
gibility Thresholds
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Mean Estimates Mean Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Estimates
Enrolled in College .773 .003 .786 .027*** .775 .007*
(.009) (.004) (.004)
Sample size
# of obs. used in estimation 50,388 194,513 203,752
# of obs. in full sample [96,390] [194,513] [284,601]
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment rates of grant applicants at the different income eligibility thresholds. The window size
for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Each coefficient
comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the mean
value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and treatment sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 4 – Discontinuities in College Enrollment Rates at Different Income Eli-
gibility Thresholds, by Subgroup of Applicants
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Mean Estimates Mean Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. By Year of Application
2008 Applicants .753 .002 .780 .033*** .769 .009
(.015) (.009) (.006)
2009 Applicants .782 .002 .788 .025*** .777 .012*
(.013) (.008) (.006)
2010 Applicants .778 -.001 .789 .025*** .778 .003
(.013) (.008) (.007)
B. By Gender
Females .768 .012 .788 .023*** .773 .006
(.009) (.006) (.005)
Males .780 -.006 .782 .034*** .778 .010
(.014) (.007) (.007)
C. By Level of Study
First Year .761 -.001 .755 .043*** .740 .007
(.016) (.008) (.010)
Second Year .855 .008 .835 .021*** .841 .013*
(.014) (.008) (.007)
Third Year .742 .005 .795 .021** .771 .006
(.018) (.010) (.007)
Fourth Year .711 -.010 .741 .042*** .731 -.001
(.023) (.016) (.012)
Fifth Year .750 .004 .776 .017 .749 -.003
(.027) (.017) (.012)
D. By Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank
First Quartile .740 -.002 .748 .034*** .746 .005
(.018) (.011) (.009)
Second Quartile .767 -.012 .791 .040*** .783 .008
(.020) (.011) (.008)
Third Quartile .803 .004 .813 .030*** .814 .006
(.014) (.008) (.007)
Fourth Quartile .835 -.000 .847 .018* .843 .011
(.015) (.009) (.007)
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment rates of several subgroups of grant applicants, at different income eligibility thresholds.
Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The window size for
the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Columns 1, 3 and
5 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the cutoffs. Quartiles of Baccalaure´at percentile rank are computed separately for each year of application
and level of study. The non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidths computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths
are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 5 – Discontinuities in College Enrollment and Student Persistence Rates
at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff, First-Year Undergraduate and
Graduate Applicants
Sample: First-Year First-Year All First-Year
Undergraduates (U) Graduates (G) Applicants (U + G)
Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Mean Estimates Mean Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome in Year t of Application (2008 and 2009 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t .734 .049*** .733 .037** .733 .041***
(.015) (.017) (.009)
16,467 14,071 40,555
[23,672] [16,883] [40,555]
Completed all First Year .468 .047**
Credits in t (G) (.020)
12,372
[16,883]
B. Outcome in Year t+1 (2008 and 2009 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t+1 .588 .039*** .638 .049** .609 .049***
(.014) (.021) (.015)
23,672 10,477 21,739
[23,672] [16,883] [40,555]
Enrolled in Second .376 .037** .429 .046** .398 .044***
Year Level in t+1 (.017) (.018) (.014)
14,982 15,100 23,161
[23,672] [16,883] [40,555]
Completed First and Second .239 .022
Year Credits in t+1 (U) (.015)
15,405
[23,672]
Obtained Master’s .378 .049**
Degree in t+1 (G) (.022)
9,994
[16,883]
C. Outcome in Year t+2 for Undergraduate Students (2008 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t+2 .509 .044*
(.026)
7,437
[10,951]
Enrolled in Third .302 .019
Year Level in t+2 (.021)
9,065
[10,951]
Obtained Bachelor’s .255 .021
Degree in t+2 (.017)
10,951
[10,951]
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment and student persistence rates of applicants entering the first year of an undergraduate
or graduate degree program, at the income eligibility thresholds between level 0 (fee waiver only) and level 1 (fee waiver plus an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros)
grants. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The
window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.16. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility
thresholds. The non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidths computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are
computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The number of observations used in the non-parametric
estimations are reported below the standard errors. Full sample sizes are in square brackets. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 6 – Discontinuities in College Enrollment and Degree Completion Rates
at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff, Final Year Undergraduate and
Graduate Applicants
Sample: Final Year Final Year All Final Year
Undergraduates (U) Graduates (G) Applicants (U + G)
Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric Baseline Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Mean Estimates Mean Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. College Enrollment (2008 to 2010 Applicants)
Enrolled in College .795 .021** .776 .017 .789 .019***
in Graduation Year (.010) (.017) (.007)
34,261 12,198 66,140
[45,780] [20,360] [66,140]
B. Degree Completion (2008 to 2010 Applicants)
Obtained Degree .587 .029*** .566 .035* .580 .031***
in Graduation Year (.011) (.019) (.009)
40,789 13,073 64,735
[45,780] [20,360] [66,140]
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment and degree completion rates of applicants entering the final year of an
undergraduate or graduate degree program, at the income eligibility thresholds between level 0 (fee waiver only) and level 1 (fee waiver and annual
cash allowance of 1,500 euros) grants. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.16. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the mean
value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidths computed
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses. The number of observations used in the non-parametric estimations are reported below the standard errors. Full sample sizes
are in square brackets. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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